The relationship between India and Pakistan, despite their shared history and status as neighboring countries, remains strained, marked by decades of conflict, mistrust, and diplomatic setbacks. Pakistan has, time and again, attempted to cause unrest in India. Drawn into the crucible of conflict in 1947, when tribal marauders from Pakistan descended upon Kashmir, igniting a war that stood to scar the newly formed Republic of India. Again in 1965, the flames of aggression were fanned by Pakistan’s hand, leading to a full-scale war that saw Indian forces advance to the gates of Lahore. That tempest finally calmed with the signing of the Tashkent Agreement in 1966, a diplomatic attempt to restore the delicate thread of peace. India and Pakistan have engaged in multiple armed conflicts since then, including the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the Kargil war in 1999. Pakistan has, meanwhile, continued to sponsor terrorism in India, including its notorious role in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Despite all this, India continued to endure decades of conflict and mistrust, and nothing compelled India to reconsider the “Indus Water Treaty” (IWT).
Yet again, India’s patience was tested in April this year when innocent civilians were killed in cold blood in Pahalgam. India’s response to the terror attack by Pakistan was multipronged. India started with diplomatic call-outs and proceeded to take a hard stance, which included putting IWT in abeyance, followed by attacks on Pakistan’s terror bases under Operation Sindoor. Developments like these, including India’s notice to Pakistan to modify the treaty in January 2023, have raised questions about its future.
Despite the current cessation of firing and military action between India and Pakistan, IWT is still kept in abeyance by India. Addressing the nation for the first time since Operation Sindoor, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on 12th May 2025, in his address, made it clear that India will not hold talks with Pakistan on IWT until it takes action against the terrorists hiding in its country. This statement speaks volumes about India’s seriousness in its fight against terror.
History of IWT
The IWT, signed on 19th September 1960, between India and Pakistan, stands as one of the most enduring bilateral agreements in a region marked by geopolitical tensions. The 1947 partition of British India created complex challenges for resource sharing, particularly concerning the waters of the Indus River system, vital for agriculture and livelihoods in both nations. A Standstill Agreement temporarily maintained pre-partition water arrangements, but its expiration on 1st April 1948 led India to reduce water flows to Pakistan, in turn escalating tensions. An interim Inter-Dominion Accord on 4th May 1948, required India to supply water in exchange for compensation, serving as a stopgap measure.
The dispute led to mediation by the World Bank, culminating in the IWT after six years of negotiations. Signed in 1960, the treaty allocates the Indus system’s six rivers and establishes mechanisms for cooperation, aiming to ensure equitable and sustainable use of water.
Key Provisions of the Treaty
The IWT is a detailed agreement that allocates rivers of the Indus system and outlines mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution regarding the sharing of water from the Indus River.
The IWT divides the Indus system’s rivers into two groups:
Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej): Allocated to India for unrestricted use, with limited agricultural allowances for Pakistan, but Pakistan has objected to India’s projects on these rivers, such as the Shahpurkandi Dam on the Ravi.
Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab): Primarily allocated to Pakistan, with India being permitted limited use for domestic purposes, agriculture, and run-of-the-river hydropower projects, subject to strict conditions. But India’s projects, like the Kishanganga and Ratle dams, have faced Pakistan’s objections and arbitration requests, often causing unnecessary delays.
IWT established a bilateral commission, the Permanent Indus Commission, with representatives from both countries, to oversee implementation, share data, and resolve disputes. It provides a tiered mechanism for resolving disagreements, whereby issues are to be first addressed by the Permanent Indus Commission. If unresolved, disputes are referred to a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank. As a last resort, disputes are escalated to a Court of Arbitration. Both countries are required to exchange data on river flows, canal withdrawals, and planned projects to ensure transparency and compliance.
The IWT allocates approximately 80% of the Indus system’s annual flow (about 166 billion cubic meters out of 207 billion) to Pakistan, reflecting its greater dependence on the western rivers. India, despite being the upper riparian state, accepted these terms to foster cooperation.
India’s Contributions and Growing Frustrations
Post-IWT, India demonstrated goodwill by contributing significantly to Pakistan’s Tarbela and Mangla dams, second only to the United States in funding. However, India perceives the treaty as inequitable, given its larger population (1.4 billion vs. Pakistan’s 240 million), versus the 80% of the water from the Indus allocated to Pakistan. International river treaties, such as those governing the Tigris-Euphrates, Nile, or Mekong, often favor upper riparian states, yet the IWT has been unfavourable to India. Article 5 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention emphasizes equitable and sustainable use of shared water resources, considering factors like population and economic needs. India argues that IWT’s allocations, fixed in 1960, no longer reflect current realities.
Pakistan’s objections to India’s hydropower projects, often escalated to arbitration, are seen as attempts to limit India’s legitimate rights under the treaty. In January 2023, a notice was issued to modify the IWT, citing Pakistan’s intransigence . In 2024, another notice was issued to Pakistan under Article XII(3) of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor further strained relations, with India attributing the retaliation to Pakistan’s failure to curb militancy. While India has not suspended the treaty, it has kept it in abeyance, which signals a shift toward reevaluating this long-standing agreement.
The Spirit of the Treaty and Its Challenges
The IWT’s preamble emphasizes “goodwill and friendship” in managing the Indus waters cooperatively. However, India views Pakistan’s support for militancy, exemplified by incidents like Pahalgam, as a violation of this spirit. The attack, condemned internationally, has fuelled calls in India to leverage its upper riparian position, though an argument can be made that any unilateral suspension would violate international law and risk escalation.
Renegotiating the IWT could address India’s concerns, but it faces significant hurdles. The very first hurdle will be the reluctance from Pakistan to wind up its terror factory, which is the first requirement that India has proposed even before sitting at the negotiation table. Secondly, Pakistan, heavily reliant on the Indus for 70% of its agricultural output, would likely resist changes that reduce its share. A revised treaty would require mutual consent, likely necessitating third-party mediation by the World Bank or the United Nations. This process could take years, with no guarantee of success, given the current mistrust.
What will the change mean to Pakistan?
Modifying or suspending the IWT would have far-reaching consequences. For Pakistan, reduced water flows could devastate agriculture, exacerbate food insecurity, and fuel internal unrest, potentially destabilizing the region. India, while holding leverage as the upper riparian state, may risk international criticism for altering a treaty upheld for over six decades. However, it still has an upper hand, for this is still a peaceful solution compared to the bloody war Pakistan wants to indulge in, and one that it is unlikely to win, risking the lives and properties of its citizens.
For India, the renegotiation offers a chance to address water scarcity in states like Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. Jammu and Kashmir has also never been an advocate of the IWT. Pakistan will soon be seen in the United Nations internationalizing the issue and crying a humanitarian fallout. Yet, the abeyance has to be traded for Pakistan taking action against the terror groups that have existed for decades.
Path Forward
India has always stood for peace and cooperation in international affairs. However, it is difficult for a country like Pakistan, whose entire premise of its policies has been based on the principle of bleeding India by a thousand cuts, and then to negotiate at the table for peace. The current contention of India for keeping IWT in abeyance should be treated as a bargaining chip to catch the terrorists by the forelock. ‘Abeyance’ under international law is still a grey area, yet India’s notice to modify the IWT is a call for fairness, not an epitaph for cooperation. The treaty’s future hinges on both nations’ willingness to engage in good faith, but this time, Pakistan should make the first move to de-escalate and divest in its terror factories.
The views and opinions expressed here belong solely to the author and do not reflect the views of BlueKraft Digital Foundation.
